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I. Introduction:* 
*Because of the interdisciplinary nature of the discussion, I have made use of 
emphases throughout this paper. 
All too often, lately we hear or read the lament, "We just don't or can't know 
what a human being or a human person really is", or, "There just is no concensus 
or agreement on what the definition of a "human being" or a "human person" is, 
so why should one person's or one group's definition be preferred over any other? 
The definition of a "human being" or of a "human person" cannot be objectively 
determined, and so must remain a relative one." 
The aim of this paper is to debunk these current myths concerning the 
relativism of what a human being or a human person is, and to at least raise the 
question at the end of how these "myths" came about even at the level of 
scientific and philosophical professional expertise. What I will argue is that we 
can and do have an objective and empirically-based definition of a "human 
being" or "human person", and that other than conceptually one cannot really 
split a human being from a human person. "Personhood" begins when the 
human being begins. 
Toward this end I will address some of the kinds of major scientific and 
philosophical arguments used to support the 'sudden appearance of 
"personhood" at different biological "marker events", indicating that such 
arguments are grounded on scientific data which is incorrect or misapplied; and 
that the philosophical claims of these arguments are grounded in systems of 
philosophy which are themselves very problematic, as any historian of 
philosophy well knows, I with highly indefensible definitions of a "human being" 
or of a "human person". Such definitions are actually remnants of those 
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philosophical systems in which conceptual mind/body splits are still sustained, 
even today. It is important to understand that the question of "personhood" is not 
simply restricted to some wild-eyed academic's preferred theoretical ramblings, 
but that the issue has now been translated into the quite practical question of 
whether or not these "tiny" human beings are as protected ethically, socially and 
legally as are more "mature" human beings - or "persons". The really 
"burning" question is: if the early human embryo is a human being, is it also a 
human person? 
II. General scientific and philosophical background of the issues 
Before addressing the specifics of the science and philosophy, some general 
charts are provided for an over-all view of the issues. Only a few of the major 
marker events will be covered, as the actual list is quite long. I refer you, however, 
to my own analysis of 26 arguments which goes into much greater detail. 
Fig. I (p. 39) indicates some of the suggested biological marker events during 
embryological development - from just before fertilization to about 14-days.2 
During this period the major philosophical issues include if the early human 
embryo is an individual (a prerequisite for personhood), and/or if he/she 
actually possesses the genetic or formal capacity of a human being or human 
person. It is during this period also when mass-confusion reigns on the 
philosophical mis-use of the terms "possibility", "probability", "potentiality" and 
"potency." These positions are generally arguing for either the actual capacity for, 
or the actual exercising of either "rational attributes" or sentience. 
Daly3 represents the type of argument which claims that "personhood" begins 
at the time when the sperm has penetrated the ovum. Examples of positions 
arguing for "fertilization" are my own, or Ashley and O'Rourke4 (although 
within the advocates of "fertilization", much ambiguity exists as to which point 
during the process of fertilization itself "personhood" begins). Suarez5 will argue 
for the 2-cell stage. And a great deal of the current literature consists of arguments 
for the 14-day stage.6 In these latter arguments a general distinction can be made 
between those which contain elements concerning the pre-condition for the 
exercising of so-called "rational attributes" - e.g., self-awareness, self-
consciousness, interaction with the environment, etc. - and those concerning 
the pre-condition for sentience, or the ability to feel pain. For those unfamiliar 
with philosophy, let me just point out that such distinctions - as well as those 
that will follow - are grounded in different philosophical schools of thought. 
Some of the suggested biological marker events range from 14-days and after, 
as indicated in Fig. 2.7 During this period the major philosophical issues include: 
individuality, the biological substrate as the precondition for the capacity for 
"rational attributes", or for sentience - or for the actual exercising of those 
capacities. The full integration of those substrates and capacities are also at issue. 
As noted, writers such as BoleS argue that individuality and ensoulment are not 
possible until after 2-6 weeks, whereas Singer and Wells9 argue that only after 6 
weeks is sentience possible. At 8 weeks Lockwood1o argues for the beginning of 
"personal identity", and Shea ll for that point where the brain actually controls 
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bodily functions as a whole. Finally, there are those who focus not on the mere 
capacity but the actual integration and exercising of "rational attributes" and/or 
sentience as a condition for true personhood, such as Harel2 or Englehardt13 (or 
SingerI4). 
As these and similar distinctions made between a human being and a human 
person are really philosophical distinctions, I have sketched the major historical 
philosophical sources of a mind/body split in Fig. 3 (although one could go back 
to Plato and beyond).ls The major point I want to indicate is that some 
philosophical schools of thought define a human being as one whole substance, 
and thus there is no mind/body split inherent in their theories. Such theories 
define a human being in terms of the actual nature of the human substance. 
Characteristics such as "rational attributes", sentience, moral autonomy, etc., are 
only activities of powers which are of secondary consideration, because they are 
consequent to or follow upon the actual nature of that substance.16 Other 
"schools" do maintain a mind/body split inherent in their theories; a human 
being is defined as two independent and separate substances. Interestingly, most 
of the theories addressed here are derivative of these modern philosophies, 
especially that of Descartes.17 
An entire paper - or even a book - could be dedicated to explaining the 
theoretical and practical consequences of such mind/body splits, especially in the 
present context. Suffice it to point out that where there is such a split - where the 
mind (or even the whole "soul") is an independent substance in and of itself, 
separate or apart from the "body" - which is seen as an independent and 
separate substance in and of itself - then it is impossible either theoretically or 
biologically to "piece them back together again", as Humpty Dumpty might have 
said! Nor could one explain any interaction between these separate "substances". 
We can see the effect of such Cartesian dualism - and the consequent historical 
breaking-off to either rationalism or empiricism in the distinctions writers make 
here between a human being and a human person. 
OJ. Biological marker events of personhood 
There are enumerable points along the continuum of embryological 
development at which different writers claim the appearance of so-called 
"personhood." These are claimed as "biological marker events of personhood" 
- before which there is only a human being (at best); and after which there is a 
human person. Before that biological point, then, the human embryo or human 
fetus is considered as only an "object", a "thing" which may be used or dealt with 
according to the personal objectives or desires of another human being - who is 
a human person. After that particular biological marker event we suddenly have 
a human person, who is now considered a "subject" or an entity deserving of 
protections against the objectives or desires of another human person. 
A. Syngamy as the beginning of personhood 
In order to identify the major issue quickly, a few questions might be posed so 
as to clarify at the start exactly what is at stake when we define a human being 
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or a human person in one way or another. If our definition is incorrect - even in 
part - then the consequences of this incorrect definition are long-ranged and 
potentially profound. Aristotle reminds us of something we all know too well. To 
paraphrase him: A small error in the beginning leads to a multitude of errors in 
the end. 18 In this case, if one's definition of a human person is incorrect, then one 
might find one's self experimenting on something which one thought was not a 
human being or a human person - but which in fact really is. 
So I pose the question - how would you yourself define a human person? 
Would you consider any of the following a human person: a rock; a head of 
cabbage; a giraffe; . . . those who are old and senile in a nursing home; 
Alzheimers patients; Parkinsonian patients; stroke victims; comatose patients; 
drunks and alcoholics; drug addicts; the homeless, poor; prisoners; the 
emotionally ill and depressed; mothers-in-law; teen-agers; the physically 
handicapped; the mentally ill; children under 7 years of age; a new-born baby; the 
fetus before the mother has given birth (or, at 6 months, 8 weeks, 35 days, 14 
days, 6 days, 2 days, fertilization, or the egg or the sperm). These latter examples 
actually constitute some of the different biological markers at which various 
writers claim that there is present a human person. Obviously there is some 
disagreement about exactly when we have, definitionally, a human person 
present. And that period of time between fertilization and 14 days is the grayest 
area, i.e., the seemingly most difficult and most controversial stage. 
What, then is a human being or person - and when does he or she begin? I 
will argue that at the biological marker or moment of syngamy - i.e., the last 
crossing-over of the maternal and paternal chromosomes at the end of 
fertilization, substantial change (or a change in natures) has taken place - and a 
new, unique, living, individual human person is present. I will also argue that 
from syngamy onward - including the zero to 14-day old human embryo stage 
- until the death of the adult organism - accidental change (or a change only in 
accidents) has taken place, in which a human person is continuously present. 19 
1. The connection between science and philosophy 
First, although a question about "natures" seems to be fundamentally a 
philosophical one, I would argue that any philosophical reflections, analyses or 
accounts about the nature of a human being or person must begin or start with the 
empirically observable biological facts.20 Otherwise our philosophical concepts 
actually bear little or no relation or resemblance to the real world which we are 
trying to understand and explain by those concepts. Instead, I would suggest, we 
are left with mUltiple half-truths or fantasies - or wishful thinking! 
Epistemologically, the starting point of our philosophical questions and 
investigations about reality must be grounded in that empirical and scientific 
reality. Only in this way can we have a realistic or objectively-based definition of 
a human being - one that is not relativistic. 
The question requires that we start with the biological facts that we do know 
about human beings and human persons. It is critical to understand how very 
important it is to use the correct biological facts in any considerations of a 
February, 1993 21 
definition of a human person - as well as to consider exactly when during 
embryological development we can claim there is a human person present. 
Operationally, what is the connection between a thing's nature and the 
biological facts? Put briefly, the answer is that we can know what a thing is by 
observing its actions or functions - how it behaves, what it does. We know that 
a thing acts according to the kind of thing it is, i.e., its nature. That is simply an 
empirically observable fact. In first-year chemistry or in microbiology students 
are given "unknowns" which they must identify by means of the kinds of actions 
or reactions exhibited by these "unknowns." Indeed, this is the obvious principle 
behind any basic or experimental research. The research biologist first observes 
the actions, reactions, functions of a biological entity and reasons from these 
specific kinds of actions back to the specific kind of nature it possesses. It is this 
nature which directs and causes such characteristic actions. As biology texts 
themselves discuss it: function follows form.21 Thus Na burns orange, and cobalt 
burns blue/green - or betahemolytic streptococcus can only be grown on 
specific culture medium containing blood, but not on other mediums. Further, a 
thing is not only characterized by its nature which determines the specific kinds of 
actions it can do - but the same nature limits the kinds of actions it can do. That 
is, there are certain actions which a thing can not do because it does not have the 
specific kind of nature it would need to do it. For example, birds have wings and 
so can fly - but stones, dogs or human beings can't fly; corn stalks produce ears 
of corn and corn proteins and corn enzymes - but acorns, tomato plants or 
asteroids do not and cannot produce corn or corn proteins. Frog embryos direct 
the formation of frog tissues and organs - but they cannot direct the formation 
of human tissues and organs. 
Apply these considerations to the point at hand. To determine what a human 
being or person is is really not all so difficult as is often claimed. We are not Gods 
or angels - but embodied human beings.22 We do have bodies - don't we? At 
least I have never seen a simple "soul" wandering aimlessly around the labs, or 
manipulating an electron microcsope - or a stethoscope - without a body. In 
fact, I have never seen even a Platonic or a Cartesian philosopher "thinking" 
without his or her body! As Aristotle noted, the whole man thinks; the whole 
man knows; and the whole man acts.23 There are voluminous biological facts 
which we do know already about the human body and its embryological 
development. Clearly by observing and studying these known biological facts-
how the human being begins his or her biological existence as a specifically 
human zygote, and the kinds of specifically human functions and human actions 
that take place during embryological development - we can then determine to a 
very sophisticated extent the nature of a human being or a human embryo - or 
what it is. So 1 will turn now to a brief consideration of the biological facts about 
which most if not all of us are already aware. 
2 Thescrentificfac~ 
Before fertilization there exist a human sperm (containing 23 chromosomes) 
and a human ovum or egg (also containing 23 chromosomes - the same number, 
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but different kinds of chromosomes).24 Neither the sperm nor the egg, singly, by 
itself, can become a human being - even if implanted in the womb of the 
mother. They are only gametes - they are not human embryos or human beings. 
In contrast, the single-cell human zygote formed after fertilization, or syngamy, 
contains 46 chromosomes (the number of chromosomes which is specific for 
members of the human species) - and these 46 chromosomes are mixed 
differently from the 46 chromosomes as found in the mother or in the father 
-that is, they are unique for that human individual. If allowed to "do his or her 
own thing", so to speak, this human zygote will biologically develop 
continuously without any biological interruptions, or gaps, throughout the 
embryonic, fetal, neo-natal, childhood and adulthood stages - until the death of 
the organism. And with the advent of in vitro fertilization techniques, we can see 
that the early human embryo can develop in vitro on his or her own without the 
nutrition or protection ofthe mother for quite a while - someday, perhaps, even 
until "birth!" 
In response to Daly, who argues that personhood begins at penetration (before 
syngamy), I want to reiterate that a human gamete is not a human being or a 
human person. The number of chromosomes is only 23; it only acts or functions 
biologically as an egg or as a sperm, e.g., it only makes egg or sperm enzymes and 
proteins, etc., not specifically human enzymes and proteins; and by itselfit does 
not have the actual capacity or potency yet to develop into a human embryo, 
fetus, child, or adult, even if already enveloped by a single membrane, as at 
penetration, before the chromosomes have combined. And in that sense gametes 
are only possible human beings (i.e., non-existent human beings). Only after the 
sperm and the egg chromosomes combine properly and completely do we have a 
human being. Individually, the nature of a sperm is different from the nature of an 
egg - and both are different from the nature of the human zygote which is 
formed when their chromosomes combine. 
Thus from perhaps an Aristotle-the-biologist's point of view, one would say 
that before fertilization there are two natures - i.e., the nature of an egg and the 
nature of a sperm. After fertilization there is a human zygote with one nature, i.e., 
the nature of a human being. Again, in fertilization there is substantial change,2S 
i.e., a change in substance or nature. The substances or natures of the egg and the 
sperm have changed into the nature of a human being. This is known empirically 
by observing the number and kinds of chromosomes present before and after 
fertilization, and by observing the different characteristically specific actions and 
functions of the egg, the sperm, and the human zygote. After fertilization there is 
not substantial change, but only accidental change.26 That is, the nature of the 
human being does not change, only its accidents change. Thus embryological 
development does not entail substantial change, but only accidental change. 
Once it is a human being it stays a human being, and acts and functions 
biologically as a human being. The human zygote produces sepcifically human 
enzymes and proteins; he or she forms specifically human tissues and organ 
systems, and develops humanly continuously from the stage of a human single-
cell zygote to the stage of a human adult.27 
This is observed empirically. A human zygote does not produce cabbage or 
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carrot enzymes or proteins, and does not develop into a rock, an ear of corn, nor 
into a cat, a horse, a chicken, or a giraffe. Empirically it is observed that a human 
zygote produces specifically and characteristically human proteins and enzymes 
at the moment of syngamy - as demonstrated recently, for example, by 
experiments using transgenic mice28 - and that he or she develops continuously 
throughout embryological development in a specifically and characteristically 
human way. 
In short - the biological facts demonstrate that at syngamy we have a truly 
human nature. It is not that he or she will become a human being - he or she 
already is a human being. We know that empirically. And this nature or capacity 
to act in a certain characteristic way is called, philosophically, a nature or a 
potency. 29 Thus a human zygote or embryo is not a possible human being;30 nor is 
he or she potentially a human being;3! he or she is a human being. A human 
zygote, embryo or fetus does not have the potency to become a human being, but 
already possesses the potency or capacity to be at that moment a human being. 
And that potency will direct the accidental development, i.e., the embryological 
development, of his or her own self from the most immature stage of a human 
being to the most mature stage of a human being. 
Now, this is strongly convincing empirical evidence that at syngamy there is a 
human being; but is there also a human person - or not? It is in this shifting from 
the paradigm of a human being to that of a human person where the philosophy 
comes into play again. Is a human being also a human person; or are they 
different things? Which philosophy is adequate to cope with this biological data? 
3. The matching philosophical concepts 
(Fig. 3) With even only a cursory rummaging through the history of 
philosophy, there is one major "realistic" philosophical "ball-park" which would 
deny an essential distinction between a human being and a human person - they 
cannot be split or separated from each other - except perhaps only conceptually. 
This philosophy was part of a 2500 year old tradition which was the bath water, 
so to speak, that was thrown out with the baby! It is the philosophical ball-park, 
for example, of Aristotle-the-biologist.32 For Aristotle - as well as for others, 
such as Thomas Aquinas - his major metaphysical and anthropological treatises 
argue consistently for a human substance with no mind/body split (although 
there is evidence of a serious Platonic streak in his De Anima - that atypical and 
historically problematic treatise of Aristotle's so often quoted by contemporary 
scholars - as well as historians who researched for Roe v Wade). As Aristotle 
argues, " ... 'nature' has two senses - matter and form. If one considers 'nature' as 
the form, then it would be the shape or form (not separate except in statement) of 
things which have in themselves a source of motion"33 (emphasis added). Again, 
he says, " .. . the physicist is concerned only with things whose forms are separable 
[in the mind], indeed, but do not exist apart from matter."34 And similarly, matter 
cannot exist apart from the form. For Aristotle, the human being is defined as one 
composite substance - the vegetative, sensitive and rational powers of the 
"soul" together with the human "body."3s The whole soul, he wrote, is 
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homogenous, and in each part of the body as one whole composite: 
In each of the bodily parts there are present all the parts of the soul, and the souls so 
present are homogenous with one another and with the whole; this means that the several 
parts of the soul are indisseverable from one another. 36 (emphasis added) 
And in contrast to his opposite view in the very same De Anima (which 
contradicts the above passage), Aristotle addresses the very possibility of a 
"being-on-the-way", or an "intermediate" human being, railing against the 
anthropological consequences of Plato's or Pythagoras' mind/body split when he 
very sarcastically retorts: "Yet how are we to believe in such things?"37 Although 
Aristotle-proper did not actually use the term "person", he clearly would have to 
concur that a human being is always a human person, for neither form nor matter 
can exist on their own as two different things or independent substances. 
Thomas Aquinas, to give another example, puts an even finer gloss on 
Aristotle's anthropology, by affirming his own adamant rejection of Plato's 
anthropology. To paraphrase Thomas: the name of "person" (and he uses that 
term) does not belong to the rational part of the soul, nor to the whole soul alone 
- but to the entire human substance (or, subsistens}.38 This means that the whole 
soul, whole body and its act of existing constitute one substance entire - with no 
separate and troublesome independent "parts" which are claimed to be true and 
independent substances. And it is worth noting that Aquinas is one of the only 
philosophers who includes undesignated matter in his formal definitions of 
natural things - of which man is one.39 
For Thomas, a human being is a human person, and the later characteristics 
which we will look at in these debates, such as "rational attributes", autonomous 
willing or sentience, are only consequential and secondary or accidental actions 
which follow upon certain powers (not "parts") which themselves follow upon 
the essential nature of the human being itself.40 That nature is defined as the 
single, whole, formal, material and existential human substance. As Thomas 
states: 
... the soul must be in the whole body [and therefore not just in the brain], and in each part 
thereof . .. for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies; and in 
natural things, the definition does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter 
.. . so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, flesh and bones.41 
(emphasis added) 
These philosophical precisions force at least two major questions on any of the 
several types of Aristotelean/Thomistic frameworks. First, if it is claimed that the 
"rational" soul - which "organizes and directs embryological development" 
-is not infused until sometime up to about the third month,42 then what explains 
the specifically human organization of the human embryo and human fetus up to 
that point? Hasn't the work of this supposed "delayed rational soul" already been 
done - as empirically verified? If so, then this biological evidence of specifically 
human organization which we do empirically observe must be accounted for by 
the presence of the human soul right from the beginning. In addition to the 
specifically human structural organization from the beginning, we also 
empirically observe specifically human functions and activities from the 
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beginning - e.g., the production of specifically human proteins, enzymes, etc. If 
so, then this biological evidence of specifically human functions and activities 
which we do empirically observe must be accounted for by the presence of the 
human soul right from the beginning. 
Second, for both Aristotle and Thomas the "rational soul," or more properly, 
power, includes virtually the vegetative and sensitive powers,43 and for neither is 
there such a thing as a "rational soul" alone, or even a whole soul alone - or a 
whole soul without a body (except in some sections of the De Anima). The whole 
human complex (body and soul) must be present together at once. Apart from 
the biological and conceptual absurdity of an "intermediate man", if there were 
only a "human vegetative" soul present at first, how do we explain the 
production of specifically human enzymes and proteins - instead of carrot or 
corn enzymes - from the very start? If there were only a "human vegetative and 
sensitive" soul present, how do we explain the production of specifically human 
tissue and organs - instead of only giraffe or gorilla organs and systems? If the 
human soul cannot be split (and must contain all three powers at once), and if 
specifically human enzymes, proteins, tissues, organs and structures are 
empirically observed - which they are - then the human rational soul must be 
present at the very beginning along with the human vegetative and sensitive 
"powers" (not "parts") of the human soul. And this "soul" - or, more properly, 
these powers - must exist as a composite with the human body which it is 
organizing and whose functions and activities it is directing. Thus, at syngamy, I 
would argue, the "matter" is already appropriately organized as human - since 
we empirically observe it as human and as developing humanly. 44 
So far the scientific facts and the philosophical concepts match. At this point I 
want to take a closer look at the biological facts after fertilization, i.e., those of 
human embryological development. Along the way I will point out several other 
different biological "marker events"of personhood which have been variously 
argued by others. All of these writers will make a distinction between a human 
being and a human person - supposedly based on these biological marker 
events. The use of certain biological data which they will use to support their 
arguments will also be addressed. 
B. Zero - 14-days 
As noted above, the newly formed single-cell human zygote consists of 46 
chromosomes and non-nuclear DNA in which are coded the specific directions 
for virtually all of the processes of embryological development. The content of 
this initial pool of genetic information never changes throughout embryological 
development. Yet it has been argued by Bedate, Cefal045 and Bole46, for example 
(Fig. 1), that not all of the information needed is present in this single original cell, 
that some of the information comes from "positional molecules" in later stages of 
development, and some even comes from the molecules originating from the 
mother. They conclude that the original zygote does not contain all of the 
information needed to be a self-directing, human individual, and therefore it is 
not a human person. 
26 Linacre Quarterly 
I would question this biological data. First, "molecular information" or 
"positional information" itself is coded in the original single-cell human zygote. 
As the well-known embryologist Moore discusses at great length, the genetic 
information in the original human zygote determines what molecules will be 
formed, which in turn determine what proteins and enzymes will be formed, 
which determine which tissues and organs will be formed. In genetics this is called 
the "cascading effect."47 That is, the information in the original single-cell human 
zygote "cascades" throughout embryological development - each previous 
direction causing the specific formation of each succeeding direction. Thus, all 
"positional" or "molecular" information or direction is already determined itself 
by the information which preceeded it, and ultimately by the original 
information in the single-cell human zygote.48 Second, although the information 
in the human zygote may direct the absorption of molecules from the mother 
-that hardly means that the maternal molecules or the mother herself 
determines the very nature of the growing embryo or fetus which she is nurturing. 
(This argument is also rejected by Suarez49). The nature of the embryo or fetus, as 
is known, is determined by the formal biological genetic make-up of the zygote 
from which he or she continuously develops - and the directing of this 
absorption of maternal molecules is done by the genetic information within the 
embryo or fetus - not by the mother or any genetic or "molecular" information 
from the mother. Those are simply the correct biological facts. As Jerome 
Lejeune, the Nobel-prize winning geneticist has testified: 
... each of us has a unique beginning, the moment of conception .. . As soon as the 
twenty-three chromosomes carried by the sperm encounter the twenty-three 
chromosomes carried by the ovum, the whole information necessary and sufficient to 
spell out all the characteristics of the new being is gathered ... (W)hen this information 
carried by the sperm and by the ovum has encountered each other, then a new human 
being is defined which has never occurred before and will never occur again ... [the 
zygote, and the cells produced in the succeeding divisions] is not just simply a non-
descript cell, or a "population" or loose "collection" of cells, but a very specialized 
individual, i.e., someone who will build himself according to his own rule. "50 (emphasis 
added) 
Next, it is argued by some that this original single cell divides neatly first into 2 
cells, then into 4 cells, then into 8 cells, etc.51 This biological data too is 
questionable, (and has consequences in understanding the argument about 
"totipotency"). As known and published in embryological textbooks for over 60 
years (as Lejeune52 points out), the original single cell divides into 2 cells - and 
then only one of those cells divides, giving 3 cells. After a time the other cell 
divides, making it 4 cells, and then 8 cells, etc. 
Part of what happens at this three-cell stage is that one can observe empirically 
the process of methylation. This observation is important philosophically. Many 
argue that these very early cells - including the original single-cell zygote up to 
the 8-cell stage - are "totipotent."53 They explain totipotent cells as the most 
vaguely directed and least differentiated cells in all of embryological 
development. Each cell is not yet determined enough to be classified as an 
individual human being or a part of an individual human being. These cells, 
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they say, have not yet "made up their minds" what they want to be. They can 
become any number of things. These cells are not differentiated or specialized 
enough yet. What happens in early development, they claim, is that there is a 
gradual change from total unspecialization to greater and greater specialization 
or differentiation. For example, at first we have a cell that could become any kind 
of human cell. Progressively a cell becomes specialized so that it can only become 
a kidney cell, or a stomach cell, or a muscle cell, i.e., it becomes more and more 
determined and differentiated. 
This portrayal of differentiation is backwards, as Lejeune notes. The original 
single-cell human zygote is the most determined and specialized cell in all of 
development. Progressively he or she looses, in fact, the ability to use 
information. A kidney cell, for example, contains virtually all of the information 
that was in the original single human zygote cell. The human zygote has not lost 
any of this information - only the ability to use this information. This ability to 
use or not use the information that is present is partially determined by the 
process of methylation (which is coded in the original single-cell zygote). 
Through methylation and other processes during embryogenesis, genes are 
turned on or turned off. When the cell wants to control the use of cellular 
information, it methylates a molecule to silence that gene, to block or stop its use 
at a certain point in development. No information is progressively lost; only its 
use is lost. Thus a specialized kidney cell cannot be prodded to become an 
entirely new human being - not because it does not have all of the necessary 
information (it does), but because all of the information other than that of being a 
"kidney cell" has been methylated, or silenced. 54 
Thus to be so differentiated as a kidney cell is actually a negative in such 
arguments. The kidney cell cannot direct anything but a small miniscule part of 
the development of the human embryo or fetus; whereas the original single-cell 
human zygote contains and can use all of the information only partially used by 
the later cells. Thus there is nothing vague, undirected or undecided about it. It is 
the human zygote which represents the greatest fullness of human content and 
useable information, of directedness and decisive action - more than that found 
in any of the later cells. The human zygote will decide what reactions and 
formations take place. He or she will direct all of the processes and formations 
during the entire embryological process. 55 "Totipotency" is even supposed to 
happen - it is a normal part of human embryogenesis, and is indeed encoded in 
the original genetic information of the human zygote. Differentiation is also 
encoded in the original human zygote, and is partly explained by methylation. 
Differentiation, then, really represents the restricted ability to make any 
"decisions" . 
Next, Suarez argues for the 2-cell stage, with, as he claims, the completion of 
the first division and of the genetic input. "The two-cell stage already is, like the 
adult, a moment in the execution of the program 'man'." And besides, he argues, 
the two-cell stage is already the same living being as the human adult arising from 
it.56 However, we already know that the genetic input is complete at the zygote 
stage, and that the zygote in fact is the source of the genetic input of the two-cell 
stage. We also know that the zygote, too, is the same living being as both the 
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two-cell stage and the adult stage. Thus Suarez's own argument actually argues 
for the zygote rather than for his two-cell stage. 
But to continue, the cells will proceed to divide until about 5 or 6 days, when 
two cell layers are formed - the trophoblast or outer cell layer, and the 
blastocyst or inner cell layer. Some writers, such as Grobstein and McCormick, 
have stated that this stage is significant because they can demonstrate empirically 
that there can be no true human individual present at this time - we have only a 
genetic individual, not a developmental individual. A person can be present, they 
claim, only if there is a developmental individual- and this cannot take place 
until 14-days: 
I contend in this paper that the moral status - and specifically the controversial issue of 
personhood - is related to the attainment of developmental individuality (being the 
source of one individual)57 . . . It should be noted that at the zygote stage the genetic 
individual is not yet developmentally single - a source of only one individual. As we 
will see, that does not occur until a single body axis has begun to form, near the end of the 
second week post fertilization when implantation is underway. 58 
These early cells, they claim, are only "collections" of undifferentiated, 
"totipotent" cells, and they name them, or designate them collectively, as only 
comprising a "pre-embryo" (a term, by the way, which is not used by 
embryologists - only philosophers, theologians and bioethicists. And it is a term 
which was rejected by the judge in the Davis v Davis frozen embryo case). 
The scientific facts which they give to support these claims are the following. 
They claim that only the cells from the inner layer, the blastocyst, eventually 
become the adult human being. The cells from the trophoblast layer, they write, 
are all discarded after birth as the sac and the umbilical cord, etc. Thus, 
developmentally, the implication is, that we are not dealing only with those 
important cells which will become the adult human being, i.e., the blastocyst, but 
rather a mixture of "essential" and "non-essential" cells, i.e., a PRE-embryo. A 
pre-embryo, then, is not even a human being, much less a human person, yet: 
This multicellular entity, called a blastocyst, has an outer cellular wall, a central 
fluid-filled cavity and a small gathering of cells at one end known as the inner cell mass. 
Developmental studies show that the cells of the outer wall become the trophoblast 
(feeding layer) and are precursors to the later placenta. Ultimately, all these cells are 
discarded at binh. 59 
But, again, these scientific "facts" are questionable, and necessarily lead to 
questionable philosophical concepts. It simply is not true that all of the cells from 
the trophoblast layer are discarded after birth. As can be found in virtually all 
embryology texts, including Moore's text from which they quote, many of the 
cells from this trophoblast layer become an integral and essential part of the 
constitution oftheJetus, newborn and adult human being. For example, the cells 
from the trophoblast layer known as the yolk sac cells become part of the adult 
gut. And cells known as the allantois cells become part of the adult ligaments, 
blood cells and urinary bladder. 60 
Thus these "scientific" facts used by Grobstein and McCormick are, 
scientifically, highly problematic - and therefore so also are their philosophical 
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conclusions about "preembryos" and "developmental individuals" which are 
grounded on those highly problematic scientific facts. 
But the same writers continue. It is impossible, they claim, for a human person 
to be present until at least the 14-day marker event, at which point the primitive 
streak forms in the embryo. The philosophical significance of this marker, it is 
claimed, is that until the formation of the primitive streak it is possible for 
twinning to take place. The totipotent cells "do not yet know whether to be one or 
two individuals." After 14-days, they claim, twinning is not possible, and thus the 
organism is finally determinantly one individual - an essential pre-requisite for 
personhood.61 
But, again, this science is problematic. As Karen Dawson62 points out in these 
debates - and as is found in every human genetics textbook - it is possible for 
monozygotic twinning to take place after 14 days and the formation of the 
primitive streak. For example, fetus-in-fetu twins can be formed up to 2 and 3 
months after fertilization, and Siamese twins even later. Also, it is known that 
"twinning" is sometimes genetically determined and coded in the original human 
single-cell zygote (as, indeed, is totipotency and differentiation). There is nothing 
magical, it turns out, about this 14-day stage as far as the concept of individuality 
and personhood is concerned. If a 2-cell, 8-cell, implantation stage, 14-day 
primitive steak stage embryo or 4 month fetus splits into twins, that simply means 
that the original entity was one individual - and now there are simply two 
individuals. The fact of twinning says nothing about the individuality of the first 
individual. Indeed, the history of all living organisms is of one individual giving 
rise to another individual - but one would certainly not then conclude that there 
were therefore no individuals ever present, or that the former individual was 
hopelessl y "undecided." 
Ford63 also argues for the 14-day stage, based primarily on the same science 
from Grobstein, although Ford claims there is an individual present at 
fertilization - but it is only a biological individual. Rational ensoulment cannot 
take place until after 14 days, at which point there is, he claims, an ontological 
individual, i.e., when differentiation is completed and there is a distinct 
individuality.64 But aside from the problems with the science of Grobstein and 
McCormick, complete differentiation does not actually take place until well after 
birth. As the embryologist Moore states: 
Human development is a continuous process that begins when an ovum from a female is 
fertilized by a sperm from a male. Growth and differentio.tion transform the zygote, a 
single cell formed by the union of the ovum and the sperm, into a multicellular adult 
human being. Most developmental changes occur during the embryonic and the fetal 
periods, but important changes also occur during the other periods of development: 
childhood, adolescence, and adulthood . . . Although it is customary to divide 
development into prenatal and postnatal periods, it is important to realize that birth is 
merely a dramatic event during development resulting in a distinct change in 
environment. Development does not stop at birth: important developmental changes, in 
addition to growth, occur after birth .. . Most developmental changes are completed by 
the age of 2S.6S 
Certainly a 14-day embryo is definitely not completely differentiated. 
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C. After I4-days 
Sometimes Wallace,66 too, wants to argue for 14-days, but he is inconsistent 
and seems more to argue for a point after 14-days. He bases his own position on 
what he calls an "Aristotelean-Thomistic" theory of "natural law." This "natural 
law theory" grounds his distinction between transient natures (or seeds, or 
beings-on-the-way) as applied dubiously and analogously to the transition from 
plant, animal, to human nature during human embryological development; and 
stable natures, as applied to the actual embryological development of individual 
systems of plants, animals and human beings. This "transition" from plant, 
animal to human substances during human embryological development for 
Wallace is, then, actually a series of substantial changes within human 
embryogenesis itself; and once again he bases much of his argument on the 
science of Grobstein and McCormick, and a rather scholastic rendition of 
Aristotle and Aquinas, as well as a distinctively physicist's rendition of "science" . 
Two points out of many which are problematic are his descriptions of his 
" Aristotelean-Thomistic" grounding, and the blatant contradiction in his 
analogy. First, Wallace subscribes to the Aristotle of the De Anima, and 
attributes to both Aristotle and Thomas a theory of the "eduction" of these 
substantial forms from "proto-matter", substantial forms which Aristotle, he 
says, would call "natures", and which Thomas, he says, would define as (quantity 
+ proto-matter) - a definition of substance with which neither Aristotle-proper 
nor Thomas would agree. Wallace renames this as "mass-energy", to bring 
Aristotle and Thomas up to date with modern physics!67 However, Wallace is 
really elucidating a very scholastic interpretation of both Aristotle and Thomas, 
one with which neither the historic Aristotle nor Thomas can be reconciled. 
Neither of them gave any real existence to "proto-matter", or what I think 
Wallace confuses with "prime matter". And, indeed, for both of them "prime 
matter" was only a conceptual construct, and by definition, was totally without 
fomzs68 - indeed, that was the whole point! As Klubertanz states: 
Of itself, prime matter is not actually any kind a/thing; nor does it have quantity, or any 
kind of qualities or other accidents. Hence prime matter cannot exist in itself; it cannot be 
found as such in direct or indirect sense experience; it cannot even be understood 
separately from substance or substantial form. It is an intelligible co-principle ... . 69 
Thus no substantial forms can be educed from "proto-matter" for either Aristotle 
or Thomas, because there were no forms there to begin with. And Thomas, like 
Aristotle, actually argued against this sort of theory: 
Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing 
principles; but it means that the composite is created so that it is brought into being at the 
same time with all its principles . .. creation is the production of the whole being and not 
only of matter.1o 
Further, "quantity" for both Aristotle and Thomas was an accident of substance, 
not a substance itself. 71 Thus neither would even equate their "quantity" with the 
modern concept of "mass." Wallace also never includes esse (the act of existing) 
- which is the hallmark of Thomas' definition of any substance - in any ofthe 
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definitions of "substance" which he attributes to Thomas. He simply never 
mentions esse at all. 
Second, his concept of "transient natures" is drawn from rather shakey 
chemistry and biology. He claims, for example, that when Na and CI react 
together they each actually change their natures. But Na and CI are only sharing 
electrons, not protons (which determine the kind of element it is, and which place 
the element in a specific place in the periodic chart). He also fails to mark the 
critical differences between the nucleuses of radioisotopes and those of living 
cells. Nor does he mark the critical differences which distinguish the generation of 
a radioisotope from that of a plant; nor that of an animal from that of a human 
being. He also builds a "model" of what he calls "transient natures", yet admits 
that they probably are really "stable natures"! Inexplicably he will call them 
"transient natures" anyway!72 He then applies his own theory of transient 
natures, questionable even to himself - to plant and animal generation - all the 
while acknowledging that real plants and real animals have stable natures which 
are descriptive of the mature individuals only - not to the developmental stages 
of those individualsF3 How credible is such a theory? 
A final marker event I will point out is 8 weeks or several time-markers after 
that (Fig. 2). - although there are many others with equally troubling science 
invoked. Personhood, it is claimed, does not begin until the dawning of or the 
maturation of the physical substrate of human consciousness, self-consciousness, 
or sentience - i.e., the nervous system and/ or the brain. Indeed, there is already 
a movement by some in legal jurisprudence to formalize the legal concept of 
"brain birth" to denote that point in time biologically when there is present a 
"person", as a parallel to the already legal criteria of brain death. One criticism of 
this claim comes from Gareth Jones, who rejects claims that we can determine 
the biological point of either "rational attributes" or sentience. As he states, the 
parallelism between brain death and brain birth is invalid. Brain death is the 
gradual or rapid cessation of the functions of a brain. Brain birth is the very 
gradual acquisition of the functions of a developing neural system. This 
developing neural system is not a brain. He questions, in fact, the entire 
assumption and asks what neurological reasons there might be for concluding 
that an incapacity for consciousness becomes a capacity for consciousness once 
this point is passed! Jones continues that the alleged symmetry is not as strong as 
is sometimes assumed, and that it has yet to be provided with a firm biological I 
baseF4 A different Jones who is partaking in these debates makes the following 
poignant remark: 
The reproductive biologist cannot assign moral status to the sperm or the egg or the 
fertilized egg or any ofthe subsequent products that may result from this fusion ... The 
reproductive biologist can help, however, by assuring that other scientists or those who 
wish to assert a moral status, and use a biological term or concept to do so, know what 
they are talking aboutPS (emphasis added) 
The fact is that complete physiological brain integration is not complete until 
many months or years after birth,76 just as the complete exercising of "rational 
attributes" is not possible until years after birth.77 
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VI. Philosophical definitions of "personhood" 
I could continue, biologically, down any number of "marker events" where it 
is argued at different points during biological development that until that point 
there is only a human being and only after that point there is a human person. But 
virtually every single marker event claimed is also using extremely problematic 
scientific "data" to back up their philosophical claims of personhood. It would 
seem that there is more of a problem here than simply the use of problematic 
science. Perhaps there is also involved - whether consciously or not - the 
imposition on that science of certain characteristically problematic philosophical 
presuppositions. What I see is the use of specific metaphysical presuppositions 
which result in a classic mind/body - or even sometimes a body/body split. A 
rough consideration of just how different philosophical schools of thought have 
defined a "human being" or a "human person", then, is in order. Especially in 
light of the obvious biological continuity present throughout the entire course of 
embryological development, as well as the specifically human development 
which we know empirically takes place, how adequately do the various 
philosophical definitions of a human person reflect the correct biological facts as 
we empirically know them? 
I will focuse on the definition that is most generally agreed upon these days, 
i.e., one that is basically "derived" from Descrates78 or Locke.79 Generally, a 
human person is someone who is actually acting at the lime in a rational manner 
(Fig. 3). That is, he or she is self-conscious, self-aware, competent, autonomous, 
logical, mature, conversant, and interacts with the environment and other 
rational beings around him or her. In short, if one is acting rationally one is a 
person. If this is true, then 99% ofthe possible examples of human persons I gave 
you at the beginning of this paper are - by definition - not persons! 
This is the sort of philosophical definition that in fact has been used for years by 
writers such as Englehardt,80 Tooley,81 Kuhse82 and Singer83 (yes, the animal 
rights person) who argue in the literature for infanticide of even a normal healthy 
infant! If, they argue, a normal new-born baby can not act rationally (as 
described above), then it is not a subject but only an object - and we can 
therefore use it in destructive experimental research if we rational agents so chose. 
In Singer's own words: 
Now it must be admitted that these arguments apply to the newborn baby as much as to 
the fetus. A week-old baby is not a rational and self-conscious being, and there are many 
non-human animals whose rationality, self-consciousness, awareness, capacity to feel 
pain (sentience), and so on, exceed that of a human baby a week, a month, or even a year 
old. If the fetus does not have the same claim to life as a person, it appear.; that the 
newborn baby is of less value than the life of a pig, a dog, or a chimpanzee.84 (emphasis 
added) 
Would you agree that the killing of normal healthy human infants is morally 
justifiable? If not, then we have to question, at least, such very rationalistic 
definitions of a human person, and the metaphysical and epistemological 
foundations on which they are grounded. If one argues from the rationalistic 
premise that a "human person" is defined only in terms of active "reason" (or 
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only the rational part of the soul), and if only normal older children or adults 
exhibit such active "rational attributes", then even a normal newborn infant, or a 
two-year old child is not a person - and you must agree with Singer's or 
Englehardt's arguments for infanticide. 
On the other hand, sometimes a "human person" is defined only in terms of the 
whole soul- i.e., the vegetative, sensitive and rational "souls" all together. Once 
this soul unites with a body, we then have a human person. It doesn't matter, they 
say, whether this person is presently acting rationally. What is important is that 
the rational capacity is present. But if we think about it, we run into similar 
problems as mentioned earlier. If there are no vegetative, sensitive, or rational 
directions injected until about 3 months - how did a specifically human 
biochemical, tissue, organ system get built before 3 months? 
Or perhaps we should restrict ourselves to a purely material definition of a 
"human person". The human person is simply a complex system of molecules, 
tissues and organs. But this definition has continuously failed in explaining our 
experience of thoughts, ideas, and concepts, and especially of intentionally, 
willing, or choosing. It is argued that a "person" is simply a more advanced 
sophisticated phase of a material complex human being. But aren't we really 
talking then about a secondary or accidental quality? Surely the definition of the 
nature of a human person should not be put in terms of only a secondary or 
accidental phase - however sophisticated it may be. And again, if you are arguing 
from the materialist premise that a "human person" is defined only in terms of 
sentience, or the physical integration or functioning of the brain, then you will 
also have to argue for infanticide, because as pointed out, full integration and 
sentience is also not completed until several years after birth. 
V. Questions about professional "expertise" 
Perhaps this is an appropriate point to at least raise the ticklish and often buried 
question of both scientific and philosophical "expertise." It is clear even from the 
few arguments presented here (much less from the arguments which many have 
addressed in other places85) that there are serious problems with both the 
scientific and philosophical mis-information pervading these arguments on 
"personhood. " 
The science used is often cryptic and/or simply incorrect, and does not apply 
to or is irrelevant to the philosophical issue it is trying to ground. Some still insist 
that the "science" being used is correct - although certainly to so "insist" does not 
make it so. We would all welcome those who support such "scientific" claims to 
prove them. When all of the embryological, human genetic and other scientific 
texts - as well as the most recent research and assurances by the most respected 
researchers - state clearly and unequivocally that very different basic scientific 
facts are universally acknowledged which actually contradict the scientific 
"facts" used by many of the proponents of delayed personhood, let those 
proponents defend their scientific "facts" openly and publicly before a body of 
their scientific peers. 
What embryologist, for example, would agree that eggs and sperms are really 
the same as zygotes; that cells divide neatly into two, four, 8, etc.; that 
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"totipotency" is somehow problematic, vague, or "indecisive"; that none of the 
cells from the trophoblast layer ever find their way into the fetus or even the adult 
human being; that twinning never takes place after 14-days; or that the brain is 
parallel to the nervous system, or that either is fully integrated by the eighth 
week? What chemist would agree that the sharing of electrons when Na and Cl 
combine changes the very natures of these elements, or that the nucleus of a 
radioisotope is physically analogous to the nucleus of a living plant or animal 
cell? Why don't other scientists publicly or privately refute such scientific 
mis-information? Might they lose much-needed research grants if they did? At 
what point does such scientific mis-information become unethical? 
The philosophy that is often invoked is just as problematic. Sometimes the 
"philosopher" apparently has had no background in the history of philosophy, 
and seems to be totally oblivious to the theoretical problems inherent in any 
philosophical position with a mind/body split. Nor does there seem to be the 
least awareness that these philosophies are not really viable - but interesting 
today mostly from an historical or propedeutic perspective. Sometimes an 
historical philosopher is depicted with gross imprecision, or out of context -
making that historical philosopher "say" things he never would or could 
conclude to. 
There is no way many "quotes" from Aristotle, Aquinas or Descartes can be 
sustained. And it is hardly a new academic insight that the Aristotle of the De 
Anima is and has been (for centuries) highly problematic and contradictory to his 
main-stream metaphysical doctrines on substance.86 Nor did Aristotle or Thomas 
even mention "proto-matter", and both argued against such a concept. Neither 
would have defined "substance" as "mass-energy"; nor equated "quantity" with 
"mass." And Thomas would have always included esse in his definition of any 
"substance." Descartes' philosophy was abandoned hundreds of years ago 
because of its multitudinous theoretical problems - not only because of its 
mind/body split, but also because of the blatantly erroneous and absurd 
scientific theories to which it led.88 Again, let the "philosophers" in these 
"personhood" debates defend their philosophical positions with their mind/body 
splits, as well as their historical philosophical "depictions" and interpretations, 
openly and publicly before a body of philosophical scholars. Or would that be 
considered too "uncollegial"? At what point does "collegiality" become 
unethical? 
This observation has serious implications for the assumed "professional" status 
of researchers, philosophers, ethicists and bioethicists - issues which have 
received too little attention. Scientific, philosophical, ethical or bioethical 
"experts" are being used more and more as "expert witnesses" - for example, in 
the media, courtrooms, Congressional hearings, and federal panels. They help to 
determine to a great extent critical decisions and public policy. It would seem that 
they should at least be held to the same standards of professional activity as are 
other "professionals" who have as significant an impact on the public welfare. 
Interestingly, these four "professions" are not even listed in the Codes of 
Professional Responsibi/ity89 - although physicians are. I do not consider myself 
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certainly there must be some bare minimum of standards in these fields below 
which one can not go without expecting to be held accountable. 
As "food for thought", consider the above-mentioned Codes. Among the 
criteria used as standards for "professionals" in that work are: accountability and 
responsibility; competence and qualifications; education, training and experience; 
law and legal requirements; licensing, certification, and accreditation; and other 
codes, bylaws, policies and technical standards - to name but a few. A glance 
down the list of "professions" included under these standards of behavior reveals 
some interesting examples: 
1. Accountability and responsibility (p. 479): these professions state specific 
"codes of professional conduct" or "codes of ethics": accountants, arbitrators, 
architects, bankers, business executives, clinical social workers, counselors, 
dental hygienists, dentists, engineers, financial planners, government lawyers, 
hospitals, insurance agents, journalists, lawyers, legal assistants, lobbyists, 
mediators, neutrals, nurses, personnel consultants, physicians, prosecutors, 
psychiatrists, psychologists, public administrators, real estate agents, social 
workers, and trial lawyers. Note that researchers, philosophers, ethicists and 
bioethicists have no formal professional code of ethics, and no formal 
professional standards of behavior. 
2. Competence and qualifications (pp. 485-486): these professions state 
specific requirements which must be met before practising, including the mastery 
of a defined body of knowledge and the attainment of professional degrees which 
reflect similar requirements; many require testing on local, state or national 
levels: accountants, advertising agencies, arbitrators, bankers, business 
executives, clinical social workers, counselors, dental hygienists, dentists, direct 
marketers, engineers, financial planners, hospitals, insurance agents, journalists, 
law librarians, lawyers, legal assistants, mediators, neutrals, nurses, physicians, 
prosecutors, psychiatrists, psychologists, public administrators, real estate agents, 
social workers and trial lawyers. On the other hand, biological researchers are 
allowed to use radioisotopes without having a course in nuclear chemistry, or 
chemists are allowed to use infectious microbes without having a course in 
microbiology or sterile technique. Also, one finds metaphysicians teaching 
bioethics with no previous coursework, ethicists teaching metaphysics with no 
previous coursework, and bioethicists teaching metaphysics and ethics with no 
previous coursework. Wouldn't it be odd to find a lawyer teaching organic 
chemistry with no previous coursework in organic chemistry? As someone once 
aptly put it, "you can't teach what you don't know!" And although philosophers, 
ethicists, and bioethicists must meet the idiosyncratic requirements of their degree 
institutions, there are no local, state or national testing requirements or standards 
to meet in order to assure the public of any common degree of competence or 
mastery of a similarly defined body of knowledge. 
3. Education, training and experience (p. 492): these professions go beyond 
the above standards by requiring constant professional up-dating of information 
under formal, systematic conditions, as well as competence in specific training 
and a clear demonstration of effective experience: accountants, advertising 
agencies, arbitrators, architects, bankers, business executives, clinical social 
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workers, counselors, dental hygienists, dentists, engineers, financial planners, 
hospitals, insurance agents, journalists, law librarians, lawyers, legal assistants, 
lobbyists, mediators, neutrals, nurse, personnel consultants, physicians, 
prosecutors, psychiatrists, psychologists, public administrators, real estate agents, 
social workers, and trial lawyers. Note that researchers are not required to take 
courses in research ethics; nor do physicians or nurses necessarily know how to 
do basic or clinical research. Nor do philosophers, ethicists, or bioethicists have 
uniform requirements for course work,yet alone even agree on how to define the 
subject-mailers of their disciplines! There are no requirements for updating their 
bodies of knowledge, there are variable degrees and levels of post-degree training 
- if any - and there are no determinable formal and global professional 
oversights or requirements for any experience. 
4. Law and legal requirements (pp. 500-501): these professions go even 
further and require their members to practise their professions within certain 
local, state and federal legal requirements: accountants, advertising agencies, 
arbitrators, architects, bankers, business executives, clinical social workers, 
counselors, dental hygienists, dentists, direct marketers, engineers, financial 
planners, government lawyers, hospitals, insurance agents, journalists, law 
librarians, lawyers, legal assistants, lobbyists, mediators, nurses, personnel 
consultants, physicians, prosecutors, psychiatrists, psychologists, public adminis-
trators, real estate agents, social workers, and trial lawyers. There are virtually no 
local, state or federal legal requirements restricting the practise of philosophers, 
ethicists or bioethicists. 
5. Licensing, certification and accreditation (pp. 501-502): these professions 
require that their members obtain local, state or federal licensing, certification 
and/ or accreditation before they are even allowed to practise: architects, clinical 
social workers, counselors, dental hygienists, dentists, engineers, financial 
planners, hospitals, insurance agents, lawyers, legal assistants, mediators, nurses, 
personnel consultants, physicians, prosecutors, psychiatrists, psychologists, real 
estate agents, and trial lawyers. Although physicians and nurses are required to be 
licensed as care givers, they are not required to be licensed as clinical researchers; 
nor are bench scientists required to be licensed to do basic research. Clearly 
philosophers, ethicists and bioethicists are not required to be licensed or certified 
to practise on any local, state or federal level. 
In these times of specialization, many "insist" that we must rely on the 
"professional expertise" of others. But if this and other studies on the arguments 
for "personhood" indicate any thing, it is that one still must question the 
"expertise" that seems to abound today. If one prefers to propound a 
scientific/ philosophical! ethical!bioethical theory that the world is made up of 
"quadrads" or "zeta particles," for example, and that a human being is defined in 
such terms, such a theory used to be entertained "indulgently." But today, when 
such theories are taught as fact to thousands of students, and further incorporated 
into local, state, national and international public policies and guidelines which 
affect the health, welfare and very lives of multi-millions of innocent human 
beings, then such theories, as well as those who espouse and promote them, ought 
to bear serious accountability to the public who eventually bears the brunt of 
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such theoretical mis-information. 
VI. Conclusion 
Given the scientific and philosophical problems inherent in the positions 
which argue for the various biological marker events of "personhood," can we 
really accept their various conclusions? Can we accept either the "science" that is 
used or the rationalistic or empiricist philosophical definitions of human beings 
or human persons which are incorporated into those arguments? Or is it even 
possible to reconcile the correct biological facts with a philosophical definition of 
a human being or a human person? 
What I am leading to is a definition which does not split the human being from 
the human person, and which does not consist of only a part of the human beings 
of which we have experience. Can you really have a human person without 
simultaneously having a human being? And vice-versa, can you really have a 
human being without also simultaneously having a human person? 
I would argue no - you really can't split them (except conceptually), as 
rationalistic or empiricist philosophers are wont to do. But if you do define a 
human person as only a part of the whole complex - i.e., only in terms of matter, 
or sentience, or soul, or a part of the soul- then you will also ha ve to argue not 
only for delayed hominization, but for the infanticide of even normal healthy 
infants, as well. And delayed hominization simply does not match up with the 
correct empirical facts. Philosophically what has occured is that a "part" of a 
whole has been turned into a whole thing itself (e.g., the "soul" alone, or the 
"body" alone are considered separate independent substances in themselves). 
And, of course, this leads to the chronic Platonic or Cartesean problems of a 
mind/soul, soul/body, or even a body/body split - with all of the 
accompanying chorismos or separation problems latent in those philosophical 
positions. 
However, if we look closely at the earlier Aristotelean-Thomistic ball-park 
definition of a human person I would submit that - oddly enough - it matches 
the most contemporary body of scientific facts that are available today. For 
example, at syngamy substantial change has taken place, resulting in a human 
zygote possessing 46 chromosomes, and a human nature or potency which 
contains all of the information needed to effect or cause specifically human 
accidental or embryological change or development. And this original 
information is not lost until the death of the adult human being. Biological 
phenomena, such as totipotency, "positional molecules" and even twinning are 
really normal phenomena which are supposed to happen, and are explained by the 
human genetic information in the original single-cell human zygote. Once the 
biological facts are correctly understood it is not difficult to define a human being. 
From empirical observations we can draw our philosophical concepts of 
personhood, and these concepts should surely reflect as accurately as possible 
those biological facts - or else we are not philosophizing about the real world at 
all. 
I have attempted to demonstrate, however briefly, that to define a "human 
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being" or a "human person" in terms of only a part of the whole leads to 
counterintuitive incomplete expressions of what we can experience about human 
persons, as well as a mismatch with the correct empirical facts. The definition of a 
"human being" or a "human person" does not have to be relative - as long as the 
correct science is employed, and our philosophical definitions actually match that 
reality. I leave it up to you to decide which ofthe proffered definitions make that 
match. 
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